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Abstract: In this paper, I sketch an argument for the view that we cannot know (or 
have good reasons to believe) that God exists. Some call this view “strong agnosticism” 
but I prefer the term “skeptheism” in order to clearly distinguish between two distinct 
epistemic attitudes with respect to the existence of God, namely, agnosticism and 
skepticism. For the skeptheist, we cannot know (or have good reasons to believe) that 
God exists, since there can be neither conceptual (a priori) nor empirical (a posteriori) 
evidence for the existence of God. 
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1. What is skeptheism? 
In this paper, I present an argument in support of the view that some call “strong 
agnosticism.” According to Le Poidevin (2010), for instance, “[strong agnosticism] says 
that we cannot know whether or not God exists” (emphasis in original). I will use the 
term “skeptheism” to refer to the view that knowledge of God’s existence is unattainable 
in order to capture what I take to be an important difference in epistemic attitudes 
about the existence of God, namely, a difference between agnosticism (or suspending 
judgment) and skepticism.1 An agnostic is someone who suspends judgment about the 
existence of God because he or she thinks that there is no sufficient evidence either for 
or against the existence of God. But an agnostic is open, in principle, to further evidence 
that might come to light and make us revise our beliefs about the existence of God. A 
skeptheist, on the other hand, thinks that no evidence, of any kind, can show that God 
exists. As far as we are concerned, the existence of God is beyond our ken. In other 
                                                          
1 By “God,” I mean a being that, at a minimum, is perfect in terms of power, knowledge, and goodness. In other 
words, God is supposed to be an omnipotent (all-powerful), omniscient (all-knowing) and omnibenevolent (all-
good) being. On this conception of God, see Wierenga (1989, pp. 1-6). For more on the divine attributes, see Everitt 
(2010). On some puzzles concerning the divine attributes, see Author. 
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words, agnostics think that knowledge of God’s existence is possible, whereas 
skeptheists think that knowledge of God’s existence is impossible.2 
Skeptheism is also different from atheism, since an atheist thinks that we can 
know whether or not God exists. According to the atheist, we know (or have good 
reasons to believe) that God does not exist.3 But a skeptheist is someone who thinks 
that, in principle, there is no way for us to find out whether or not God exists. In that 
respect, a skeptheist is a skeptic about God’s existence, whereas an atheist denies God’s 
existence.4 
It is important to note that, although I have distinguished skeptheism from 
atheism and agnosticism in terms of the possibility of knowing whether or not God 
exists, the distinction does not turn on the any particular analysis of knowledge. For the 
same distinction can be articulated in terms of justified belief (i.e., a belief that is based 
on adequate justification) or reasonable belief (i.e., a belief for which a good reason can 
be given). That is to say, while theists would say that we have good reasons to believe 
that God exists, atheists would say that we have good reasons to believe that God does 
not exist, and agnostics would say that we have good reasons to believe neither that God 
exists nor that God does not exist, skeptheists would say that no good reasons can be 
had either for or against the existence of God. Throughout this paper, then, each 
occurrence of ‘knowledge’ can be replaced with ‘justified belief’ and each occurrence of 
‘know that’ is interchangeable with ‘justifiably believe that’. 
It is also worth noting that skeptheism is clearly different from both skeptical 
theism and negative theology. Of course, both skeptical theists and negative theologians 
do not think that God does not exist. Rather, negative theologians, such as Maimonides 
(1963, p. 482),5 claim that we cannot justifiably make any positive claims about the 
nature of God, such as “God is omnipotent,” whereas skeptical theists, such as van 
Inwagen (1995, pp. 85-95), claim that our cognitive limitations are such that we can 
never fathom God’s reasons for allowing evil in this world.6 Skeptheists, on the other 
hand, claim that it is not only God’s nature and his reasons for allowing evil that are 
forever beyond our ken but also God’s very existence. Accordingly, Figure 1 depicts the 
attitudes one can take vis-à-vis the existence of God. 
                                                          
2 Oppy (2006, p. 15) distinguishes between “strong agnosticism,” which is “the view that is sustained by the thesis 
that it is obligatory for reasonable persons to suspend judgment on the question of the existence of an orthodoxly 
conceived monotheistic God,” and “weak agnosticism,” which is “the view that is sustained by the thesis that it is 
permissible for reasonable persons to suspend judgment about on the question of the existence of an orthodoxly 
conceived monotheistic God” (emphasis in original). Unlike Oppy’s weak and strong agnosticism, which are theses 
about what reasonable persons should (or should not) do, skeptheism (as I understand it here) is a thesis about what 
we can (or cannot) know (or reasonably believe). 
3 On the distinction between “positive atheism,” i.e., to affirm the non-existence of God, and “negative atheism,” 
i.e., to lack a belief that God exists, see Flew (1984, pp. 13-30). On atheism as “the position of not believing that a 
theistic God exists,” see Martin (1990, p. 26). 
4 Cf. Miller (2011, p. 105, footnote 26). According to Miller (2011, p. 99), “Most atheists are error theorists about 
theists; they claim that theists have genuine beliefs about the existence and nature of a divine being, but as a matter 
of fact no such divine being exists.” 
5 See also Seeskin (2005, p. 89). 
6 For more on skeptical theism, see McBrayer (2010) and the essays collected in Dougherty and McBrayer (2014). 
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Figure 1. Epistemic attitudes vis-à-vis the existence of God 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, theists, atheists, agnostics, and skeptheists would respond to the question 
“Do we know whether or not God exist?” as follows: 
 Theist: We know (or have good reasons to believe) that God exists. 
 Atheist: We know (or have good reasons to believe) that God does not exist.7 
 Agnostic: We do not know (or have good reasons to believe) that God exists.8 
 Skeptheist: We cannot know (or have good reasons to believe) that God exists.9 
Note the key difference between the agnostic’s response and the skeptheist’s response. 
The former leaves open the possibility that we might come to know whether or not God 
exists, whereas the latter amounts to denying the possibility of knowing whether or not 
God exists. Unlike the agnostic, then, the skeptheist is a skeptic about God’s existence.10 
Now that we have a good grasp of what skeptheism is and how it differs from 
theism, atheism, and agnosticism, we are in a position to see what an argument for 
skeptheism might look like. In the next section, then, I sketch an argument for 
skeptheism. 
                                                          
7 Cf. Martin (1990, p. 464) on “positive atheism,” i.e., “the belief that there is no god or gods.” See also Bullivant 
(2013, pp. 11-21). 
8 Cf. Kenny (2006, p. 21) on agnosticism, i.e., “the position of one who does not know whether or not there is a 
God.” See also Kenny (2009, pp. 117-124). 
9 A skeptheist, then, is not merely a Pyrrhonist about God’s existence, i.e., one who suspends judgment about God’s 
existence, but rather an academic skeptic about God’s existence, i.e., one who denies the possibility of knowing that 
God exists. 
10 On religious belief and skepticism, see Avnur (2011). For a recent argument that knowledge of God is a cognitive 
achievement, see Bolos (2015). 
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2. An argument for skeptheism 
2a. Why the existence of God cannot be known a posteriori 
In this section, I sketch an argument for skeptheism, the skeptical view that knowledge 
of God’s existence is beyond our ken as a matter of principle.11 To set the stage for this 
argument in support of skeptheism, consider what Philo says about the teleological 
argument in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779): 
A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very 
imperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence pronounce decisively concerning 
the origin of the whole? 
Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this time, in 
this minute globe of earth, an order or arrangement without human art and 
contrivance: therefore the universe could not originally attain its order and 
arrangement, without something similar to human art. But is a part of nature a 
rule for another part very wide of the former? Is it a rule for the whole? Is a very 
small part a rule for the universe? Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for 
nature in another situation vastly different from the former? (Hume 1907, pp. 42-
43) 
Philo thus objects to the teleological argument by pointing out that we cannot infer that 
the unobservable cause (i.e., the creator) of the universe is God solely from observable 
effects. This is so because we do not have the relevant background information that 
would license such an inference. To see why, consider how the unobservable cause of a 
viral disease is inferred from its observable effects. In the case of HIV/AIDS, for 
example, cohorts of patients that exhibit symptoms of HIV infection are tested for the 
HIV virus and are then compared with control groups of subjects that either exhibit 
symptoms but do not carry the virus or do not exhibit symptoms but do carry the virus. 
In other words, several controlled experiments, usually retrospective studies, must be 
performed before one can reasonably conclude that the unobservable cause of 
observable effect E is C. This sort of experimental reasoning is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 I should say that what follows is not intended to be an accurate interpretation of the primary texts cited. I only cite 
Hume and Gaunilo because the arguments I discuss in this section are inspired by what they say in response to the 
teleological and ontological arguments, respectively. On Philo’s objections against the teleological argument, see 
Cordry (2011). On the enduring appeal of the teleological argument, see De Cruz (2014). 
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Figure 2. Experimental reasoning from observable effect E to unobservable cause C.12 
Case Antecedent conditions Effect 
1 C, X, Y, Z E 
2 C, X, Y E 
3 C, X E 
4 C, Y E 
5 X, Y, Z No E 
6 X, Y No E 
7 X No E 
8 Y No E 
 
For example, the unobservable cause C is the HIV virus, which is always present 
whenever AIDS symptoms are present but is absent whenever AIDS symptoms are 
absent. 
Now, Philo’s point is that, in the case of the universe (the observable effect), we 
cannot perform controlled experiments, retrospective or otherwise, since there are no 
cases where the effect is absent. After all, we inhabit a small planet in one solar system 
which is part of one galaxy out of billions of other galaxies. Even if there are other 
universes, they are epistemically inaccessible to us. Moreover, for all we know, there are 
no cases where the unobservable cause (which is supposed to be God) is absent, either. 
In other words, as far as God and the universe are concerned, we lack the relevant 
background information that would warrant an inference from observable effects to 
unobservable cause. If this is correct, then the following argument can be made: 
(3.1) We can justifiably infer an unobservable cause from observable effects only if 
we have the relevant background information about the cause and the effects. 
(3.2) In the case of God and the universe, we cannot have the relevant background 
information about the cause and the effects. 
Therefore, 
(3.3) We cannot justifiably infer that God is the unobservable cause of the universe 
from observable effects alone. 
Note that this argument is neither an argument for atheism nor an argument for 
agnosticism. That is to say, this argument does not show that one should deny the 
existence of God. Nor does it show that one should suspend judgment about the 
existence of God. Rather, this argument shows that we cannot infer the existence of God 
from a certain kind of evidence, namely, empirical evidence. In other words, this 
argument shows that there can be no empirical or a posteriori knowledge of God’s 
                                                          
12 Adapted from Salmon (2013, p. 174). Compare to Mill’s joint method of agreement and difference for 
establishing causal claims. 
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existence. As such, this argument is an argument for skeptheism, in particular, 
skepticism about a posteriori or empirical knowledge of God’s existence.13 
To be clear, my argument here is not “One argument for the existence of God 
from empirical evidence (e.g., biological design, fine-tuning, miracles, moral facts, 
religious experience, etc.) fails; therefore, all empirical arguments for the existence of 
God fail.” Rather, my argument is that the existence of God cannot be known a 
posteriori because a necessary condition for arguing for the existence of God on the 
basis of empirical evidence cannot be fulfilled, namely, the condition of having the 
relevant background information that licenses an inference from observable effects (e.g., 
biological design, fine-tuning, miracles, moral facts, religious experience, etc.) to 
unobservable cause (namely, God). 
To this it might be objected that ‘God exists’ can be known (or justifiably 
believed) to be true a posteriori on the basis of religious experience and that such 
experiences count as empirical evidence for the existence of God without relying on any 
inferences from observable effects to unobservable cause.14 For example, Tucker (2011, 
p. 64) argues that religious experience counts as evidence for God’s existence on the 
basis of Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), according to which “a subject [S] has evidence 
for P if it seems [to S] that P.”15 If PC is true, and S has a religious experience where it 
seems to S as if God exists, then S has evidence for God’s existence, or so Tucker (2011) 
argues.16 
Tucker (2011, pp. 65-67) goes on to say that the evidence for God’s existence 
provided by these seemings (namely, religious experiences) will usually be undefeated 
by other evidence.17 But I think that this is mistaken. Here is why. For religious 
experience to count as empirical evidence for God’s existence there must be good 
reasons to believe that God is indeed the unobservable cause of such experiences. The 
problem is that there are other potential causes for religious experiences, such as 
psychotropic drugs18 and weak magnetic fields.19 So God is not the only potential cause 
of religious experiences. There are other potential causes. In that case, the question is 
which of these potential causes is the one that actually causes religious experience? In 
                                                          
13It is worth noting that this argument for skepticism about empirical knowledge of God’s existence does not depend 
on any Humean skepticism about causation. For the argument does not assume that we cannot infer an unobservable 
cause from observable effects. Rather, premise (3.1) says that we can justifiably do so just in case we have the 
relevant background information, so that we do not mistake mere coincidences for causal relations. As far as God 
and the universe are concerned, however, we do not have the relevant background information. 
14 Various versions of the argument from religious experience can be found in Swinburne (1979), Alston (1991), and 
Plantinga (2000). See also Zagzebski (2011). 
15 For a useful review of the literature on Phenomenal Conservatism, see Moretti (forthcoming). For objections 
against Phenomenal Conservatism, see Author. 
16 It is important to note that, as far as Phenomenal Conservatism is concerned, beliefs that are based on seemings 
are different from beliefs that are based on faith. See Huemer (2011, pp. 1-13). On faith, see Howard-Snyder (2013, 
pp. 357-372) and Kvanvig (2013). 
17 Cf. Smith (2014). 
18 See Griffiths et al (2006), Griffiths et al (2008), Griffiths et al (2011), MacLean et al (2011). 
19 See Derr and Persinger (1989) and Booth and Persinger (2009). For a critique of these results, see Granqvist et al 
(2005). For a reply, see Persinger and Koren (2005). 
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other words, of these potential explanations for the phenomenon of religious 
experience, which is the best one? 
To answer this question, then, we would have to rely on inferences from 
observable effects (in this case, religious experiences) to cause (in this case, a 
supernatural cause, such as God, or a natural cause, such as psychotropic drugs or weak 
magnetic fields). This is a general point about the use of natural phenomena as 
empirical evidence for God’s existence. That is to say, for any natural phenomenon P, 
such as religious experience, apparently miraculous events, design (either biological or 
cosmic), and the like, P is empirical evidence for God’s existence just in case there are 
good reasons to believe that God is indeed the unobservable cause of P. If there are 
alternative explanations for P, then P is empirical evidence for God’s existence just in 
case the God explanation can be shown to be better than the other explanations.20 
Showing that the God explanation is the best explanation among competing 
explanations for P, however, requires making inferences from observable effects (P) to 
unobservable cause (God), i.e., showing that God, but not the other causes, is the most 
likely cause of the phenomenon in question.21 This is why (3.3) applies to any alleged a 
posteriori or empirical evidence for God’s existence. 
If this is correct, then, contrary to Tucker’s claim that religious experience is 
typically undefeated evidence for God’s existence, there are such defeaters. The fact that 
there are natural explanations for religious experiences (e.g., in terms of psychotropic 
drugs or weak magnetic fields) defeats the claim that such experiences are empirical 
evidence for God’s existence, unless it can be shown that God—not natural causes like 
psychotropic drugs or weak magnetic fields—is the most likely cause of such 
experiences. In order to show that, however, one would have to rely on inferences from 
observable effects (religious experience) to unobservable cause (God). For this reason, 
(3.3) applies to any alleged a posteriori or empirical evidence for God’s existence, 
including religious experience. 
In other words, there are at least two competing explanations for religious 
experience and each explanation can be supported by an Inference to the Best 
Explanation (IBE).22 The first explanation is a supernatural one in terms of a 
supernatural entity like God: 
1. Some people have religious experiences. 
                                                          
20 This is why the multiverse hypothesis is a common objection against the fine-tuning argument. The multiverse 
hypothesis provides an alternative explanation for fine-tuning, an explanation that does not appeal to a supernatural 
designer, and thus fine-tuning does not uniquely support the design hypothesis. See Manson (2009, pp. 274-275). 
Cf. Juhl (2006) and Roberts (2012). See also Author and Harker (2012). 
21 Note that, even if we have good reasons to believe that natural explanations are not good enough to account for a 
given natural phenomenon, all that follows from that is that a supernatural explanation may be the best one. But a 
supernatural explanation for a natural phenomenon is a far cry from God. After all, God is supposed to be, at a 
minimum, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being. As Philo points out in Hume’s Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion, these divine attributes cannot be inferred from phenomena like design in any 
straightforward way. The same point applies to other natural phenomena, such as religious experience, and the like. 
Cf. Author. 
22 On the structure of IBE, see Psillos (2007). 
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2. The best explanation for (1) is that these experiences are caused by a 
supernatural entity. 
3. No other hypothesis explains (1) as well as the supernatural explanation does. 
Therefore, 
4. Religious experiences are probably caused by a supernatural entity. 
Of course, if the conclusion of this IBE is true, then that would be a good reason to 
believe that a supernatural entity exists.23 The second explanation is a natural one in 
terms of natural entities like psychotropic drugs or weak magnetic fields: 
1. Some people have religious experiences. 
2. The best explanation for (1) is that these experiences are caused by natural 
entities (e.g., psychotropic drugs or weak magnetic fields). 
3. No other hypothesis explains (1) as well as the natural explanation does. 
Therefore, 
4. Religious experiences are probably caused by natural entities (e.g., 
psychotropic drugs or weak magnetic fields). 
If the IBE for the natural explanation is cogent, then it counts as an undercutting 
defeater24 against the supernatural explanation for religious experience. More precisely, 
the alleged evidential connection between “religious experience” and “supernatural 
cause” is undercut by the fact that religious experiences can be explained in terms of 
natural causes, such as psychotropic drugs and weak magnetic fields. For this reason, 
again, (3.3) applies to any alleged a posteriori or empirical evidence for God’s existence, 
including religious experience. 
In fact, it may be argued that, when judged relative to generally accepted criteria 
of selection, the natural explanation in terms of natural entities (like psychotropic drugs 
or weak magnetic fields) is better than the supernatural explanation in terms of a 
supernatural entity (like God). Philosophers have offered the following key criteria for 
selecting between competing explanations (Mizrahi 2012, p. 134): 
Unification: As a general rule of thumb, choose the explanation that explains the 
most and leaves the least unexplained things (see, e.g., Kitcher 1981). 
Coherence: As a general rule of thumb, choose the explanation that is consistent 
with background knowledge (see, e.g., Kosso 1992). 
                                                          
23 Though, again, it may be a supernatural being other than God. For even if the best explanation for religious 
experience is a supernatural one, it doesn’t necessarily follow that the supernatural entity is God. After all, God is 
supposed to be, at a minimum, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being. The supernatural entity that is 
responsible for religious experience may be powerful enough to cause religious experiences, but not all-powerful. 
Moreover, why should there be one supernatural entity rather than some or many? As Philo points out in Hume’s 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the divine attributes cannot be inferred from natural phenomena like design 
in any straightforward way. The same point applies to other natural phenomena, such as religious experience, and 
the like. Cf. Author. 
24 Pollock and Cruz (1999, p. 196). 
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Simplicity: As a general rule of thumb, choose the least complicated explanation, 
i.e., the one that posits the least causal sequences and entities, and that goes 
beyond the evidence the least (see, e.g., Sober 1988, 1994, and 1998). 
Testability: As a general rule of thumb, choose the explanation that yields 
independently testable predictions (see, e.g., Zahar 1973, Kitcher 1983, and 
Leplin 1997). 
In terms of unification, the natural (psychotropic drugs or weak magnetic fields) and the 
supernatural (God) explanations seem to account for the phenomena of religious 
experience equally well. However, the supernatural explanation raises many 
unanswered questions that the natural explanation does not. Some of these unanswered 
questions are the following: Why does God make some people have religious 
experiences but not others? Many people never have religious experiences. Why is that? 
Is religious experience the best way for God to make his existence apparent to humans? 
Being omnipotent and omniscient, God could find a better way to make his existent 
apparent to humans. After all, “the concept [of religious experience] is vague, and the 
multiplicity of kinds of experiences that fall under it makes it difficult to capture in any 
general account” (Webb 2011). Yandell (1993, pp. 25-32) divides religious experiences 
by the content of the experiences as follows: monotheistic, nirvanic (Buddhism), kevalic 
(Jainism), moksha (Hinduism), and nature experiences. Why such diversity? 
In terms of coherence, the natural explanation is more consistent with our 
background knowledge than the supernatural explanation is. As far as supernatural 
entities are concerned, our background knowledge is quite limited compared to what we 
know about ourselves and the sorts of effects certain drugs can have on us. 
In terms of simplicity, the supernatural explanation postulates the existence of a 
being that is different in kind from anything else in the universe, whereas the natural 
explanation says that the causes of religious experience are of the same kind as 
everything else in nature. So the supernatural explanation postulates the existence of a 
kind of entity that is not quite consistent with our background knowledge. In general, if 
“entities [especially unobservable ones] should not be multiplied beyond necessity,” 
then the natural explanation is the simpler one. 
Finally, and more importantly, in terms of testability, there does not seem to be 
an independent way to test the supernatural explanation. To choose between these two 
competing explanations, we need a way to test them independently of the explanandum 
(i.e., religious experience). One might think that there is no way to test the supernatural 
explanation, even in principle, given that it postulates the existence of a supernatural 
entity, and thus it goes beyond the scope of scientific inquiry, which deals with the 
natural, not the supernatural. Be that as it may, there does not seem to be a way to test 
the supernatural explanation independently the explanandum (i.e., religious 
experience). 
On the other hand, the natural explanation makes at least one prediction that can 
be tested independently of the explanandum. If the natural explanation is true, then 
religious experiences can be induced on demand by using psychotropic drugs or weak 
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magnetic fields. As the aforementioned studies show (see footnotes 16 and 17), this is in 
fact the case. 
For these reasons, the natural explanation not only undercuts the alleged 
evidential connection between “religious experience” and “supernatural entity” but it 
also outperforms the supernatural explanation when the two are evaluated in terms of 
theoretical desiderata, such as unification, coherence, simplicity, and testability. All of 
this shows that (3.3) applies to any alleged a posteriori or empirical evidence for God’s 
existence (e.g., biological design, fine-tuning, miracles, moral facts, religious experience, 
etc.).25 
2b. Why the existence of God cannot be known a priori 
Now, to set the stage for the second part of the argument for skeptheism, consider 
Gaunilo’s objection against St. Anselm’s ontological argument:26 
Now, if someone should tell me that there is such an island, I should easily 
understand his words, in which there is no difficulty, but suppose that he went on 
to say, as if by a logical inference: ‘You can no longer doubt that this island which 
is more excellent than all lands exists somewhere, since you have no doubt that it 
is in your understanding. And since it is more excellent not to be in the 
understanding alone, but to exist both in the understanding and in reality, for 
this reason it must exist. For if it does not exist, any land which really exists will 
be more excellent than it; and so the island already understood by you to be more 
excellent will not be more excellent. 
If a man should try to prove to me by such reasoning that this island truly exists, 
and that its existence should no longer be doubted, either I should believe that he 
was jesting, or I know not which I ought to regard as the greater fool: myself, 
supposing that I should allow this proof; or him, if he should suppose that he had 
established with any certainty the existence of this island (Gaunilo 1962, p. 
158).27 
Accordingly, Gaunilo objects that, by using St. Anselm’s reasoning, one can prove the 
existence of the perfect island, or any other “perfect thing,” for that matter. Gaunilo’s 
objection can be expressed informally by saying that one cannot define things into 
existence. If defining God as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” shows 
that God exists, then defining the perfect island as “that island than which no greater 
island can be conceived” shows that the perfect island exist. That is, using the following 
argument schema, one can “indirectly prove” the existence of anything whatsoever: 
                                                          
25 On moral arguments for the existence of God, see Ritchie (2012). Such arguments are often construed as IBEs. 
For instance, in chapter 7 of Ritchie (2012), one can find an IBE from moral facts to the existence of God that goes 
roughly like this: there are moral facts; the best explanation for the existence of moral facts is that God exists; 
therefore, God exists. Putting aside the debate about moral realism, this IBE is strong only if the existence of God 
can be shown to be a better explanation for moral facts (assuming there are such facts) than alternative explanations. 
26 See footnote 9. For a recent reconstruction of the ontological argument, see Matthews and Rudder Baker (2010). 
On why the Anselmian notion of God is incoherent, see Bohn (2012). Cf. Author. On Spinoza’s version of the 
ontological argument, see Lin (2007). 
27 See also Author. 
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1. X does not exist. [assumption for reductio] 
2. X is perfect. [definition] 
3. If X does not exist, then X is not perfect. [from the “Existence in reality is 
greater than existence in the understanding alone” principle28] 
4. ∴ X is not perfect. [from (1) & (3)] 
5. ∴ X is perfect and X is not perfect. [from (2) & (4)] 
6. ∴ It is not the case that X does not exist. [from (1) & (5)] 
The same problem afflicts the concept of God as a necessary being, which is motivated 
by perfect-being theology (Bohn 2012). That is, using the following argument schema, 
one can “indirectly prove” the existence of anything whatsoever: 
1. X does not exist. [assumption for reductio] 
2. X is a necessary being. [definition] 
3. If X is a necessary being, then X cannot fail to exist. 
4. ∴ X cannot fail to exist. [from (2) & (3)] 
5. ∴ X does not exist and X cannot fail to exist. [from (1) & (4)] 
6. ∴ It is not the case that X does not exist. [from (1) & (5)] 
If this is correct, then the following argument can be made: 
(2.1) We can justifiably infer the existence of something from its definition or 
conception alone only if the definition or conception in question does not 
allow us to infer the existence of anything whatsoever. 
(2.2) Definitions or conceptions of God as “a perfect being,” “a necessary being,” 
or as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” allow us to infer 
the existence of anything whatsoever. 
Therefore, 
(2.3) We cannot justifiably infer the existence of God from definitions or 
conceptions alone. 
Like the argument that shows there can be no a posteriori knowledge of God’s existence, 
this argument is not an argument for atheism. That is, this argument does not show that 
one should deny the existence of God. Nor does it show that one should suspend 
judgment about the existence of God. Rather, this argument shows that we cannot infer 
the existence of God from a certain kind of evidence, namely, definitions or conceptions 
of God. In other words, this argument shows that there can be no conceptual or a priori 
knowledge of the existence of God. As such, this argument is an argument for 
skeptheism, in particular, skepticism about conceptual or a priori knowledge of God’s 
existence. 
To be clear, my argument here is not “One argument for the existence of God 
from conceptual evidence (e.g., perfect or necessary being conceptions of God) fails; 
therefore, all conceptual arguments for the existence of God fail.” Rather, my argument 
is that the existence of God cannot be known a priori because a necessary condition for 
                                                          
28 See Plantinga (1998, p. 52). 
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arguing for the existence of God on the basis of conceptual evidence cannot be fulfilled, 
namely, the condition of having a definition or conception that is neither ad hoc nor too 
broad as to allow us to infer the existence of anything whatsoever. 
2c. Why the existence of God cannot be known 
With these two arguments in hand, namely, the argument that shows that there can be 
no empirical or a posteriori knowledge of God’s existence and the argument that shows 
that there can be no conceptual or a priori knowledge of God’s existence, we can now 
combine them together into a master argument for skeptheism as follows: 
A master argument for skeptheism in terms of knowledge (or justified belief) 
(1) The proposition ‘God exists’ can be known (or justifiably believed) to be true 
either a priori or a posteriori. 
(2) The proposition ‘God exists’ cannot be known (or justifiably believed) to be 
true a priori. [from (2.3)] 
(3) The proposition ‘God exists’ cannot be known (or justifiably believed) to be 
true a posteriori. [from (3.3)] 
Therefore, 
(4) The proposition ‘God exists’ cannot be known (or justifiably believed) to be 
true. 
For present purposes, I take it that premise (1) is uncontroversial, since a proposition 
can be known (or justifiably believed) to be true either by experience (a posteriori) or 
independently of experience (a priori).29 Now, the aforementioned argument from 
premises (2.1) and (2.2) to conclusion (2.3) supports premise (2) of the master 
argument for skeptheism because it shows that there can be no conceptual or a priori 
knowledge of God’s existence. The aforementioned argument from premises (3.1) and 
(3.2) to conclusion (3.3) supports premise (3) of the master argument for skeptheism 
because it shows that there can be no empirical or a posteriori knowledge of God’s 
existence. Now, since a priori and a posteriori exhaust all ways of knowing that a 
proposition is true, it follows that the proposition ‘God exists’ cannot be known (or 
justifiably believed), which is precisely the view I have labeled “skeptheism.” 
Again, note that the master argument is neither an argument for atheism nor an 
argument for agnosticism. It is not an argument for atheism because it does not purport 
to show that we should deny the existence of God. It is not an argument for agnosticism 
because it does not purport to show that we should suspend judgment with respect to 
                                                          
29 Of course, to say that the proposition ‘God exists’ can be known to be true neither a priori nor a posteriori is not 
to say that all arguments for the existence of God ever made were either a priori or a posteriori. The former is an 
epistemological claim, whereas the latter is a historical claim. For a division of arguments for the existence of God 
into a priori and a posteriori arguments, however, see Richards (2000, p. 11), Palmer (2001, p. 2), Nagasawa (2011, 
p. 11) and Rea and Pojman (2014, p. 153). In that respect, it is also worth noting that some arguments for the 
existence of God may be mixed arguments, i.e., arguments that appeal to both conceptual and empirical evidence. 
For example, in their “New Cosmological Argument,” Gale and Pruss (1999) appeal to the concept of a necessary 
being as well as to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. 
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the existence of God. Instead, the master argument shows that knowledge of God’s 
existence is in principle beyond our ken. In that respect, it is an argument for 
skeptheism. 
As I have pointed out in Section 1, although I have distinguished skeptheism from 
atheism and agnosticism in terms of the possibility of knowing whether or not God 
exists, the distinction does not turn on any particular analysis of knowledge. For those 
who are worried about the master argument for skeptheism being tainted by some 
implicit analysis of knowledge, however, here is a version of the master argument for 
skeptheism in terms of evidence rather than knowledge: 
A master argument for skeptheism in terms of evidence 
(1*) Either conceptual (a priori) or empirical (a posteriori) evidence can be 
adduced in support of the proposition ‘God exists’. 
(2*) No conceptual (a priori) evidence can be adduced in support of the 
proposition ‘God exists’. [from (2.3)] 
(3*) No empirical (a posteriori) evidence can be adduced in support of the 
proposition ‘God exists’. [from (3.3)] 
Therefore, 
(4*) No evidence (of any kind) can be adduced in support of the proposition 
‘God exists’. 
As in the case of the previous version of the master argument for skeptheism (i.e., the 
master argument in terms of knowledge), I take it that premise (1*) is uncontroversial, 
since a proposition can be supported either by empirical (a posteriori) evidence or by 
non-empirical (a priori) evidence. As before, the aforementioned argument from 
premises (2.1) and (2.2) to conclusion (2.3) supports premise (2*) of this version of the 
master argument for skeptheism because it shows that there can be no conceptual or a 
priori evidence in support of God’s existence. The aforementioned argument from 
premises (3.1) and (3.2) to conclusion (3.3) supports premise (3*) of this version of the 
master argument for skeptheism because it shows that there can be no empirical or a 
posteriori evidence in support of God’s existence. Now, since conceptual (a priori) and 
empirical (a posteriori) exhaust all kinds of evidence that can be adduced in support of a 
proposition, it follows that there can be no evidence (of any kind) for the proposition 
‘God exists’, which is precisely the view I have labeled “skeptheism.” 
Accordingly, theists, atheists, agnostics, and skeptheists would respond to the 
question “Do we have any evidence for or against the existence of God?” as follows: 
 Theist: We have some evidence (or good reasons to believe) that God exists. 
Atheist: We have some evidence (or good reasons to believe) that God does not 
exist. 
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Agnostic: We do not have evidence (or good reasons to believe) that God exists.30 
Skeptheist: We cannot have any evidence (or good reasons to believe) that God 
exists. 
Note the key difference between the agnostic’s response and the skeptheist’s response. 
The former leaves open the possibility that there might be evidence (good reasons) for 
or against the existence of God, whereas the latter amounts to saying that no evidence 
whatsoever can be had either for or against the existence of God. 
In closing, it is perhaps worth mentioning that skeptheism is compatible with the 
existence of God. That is to say, it could be the case that God does exist but we can never 
know (or have any good reasons to believe) that God exists. In other words, skeptheism 
is an epistemic attitude one has about the existence of God. It is an attitude of total 
skepticism about the existence of God (i.e., that knowledge of God’s existence is 
impossible) rather than merely suspension of judgment, which may be temporary. Of 
course, if we cannot know (or have good reasons to believe) that God exists, then it 
follows that we do not know (or have good reasons to believe) that God exists. 
 
3. Conclusion 
My aim in this paper has been to advance an argument for the view that we can never 
know (or have good reasons to believe) that God exists. If this argument is sound, then 
the proposition ‘God exists’ can be known (or justifiably believed) to be true neither 
conceptually (a priori) nor empirically (a posteriori). I prefer to call this view 
“skeptheism” rather than “strong agnosticism” to capture a difference in epistemic 
attitudes, namely, between agnosticism (i.e., suspension of judgment) and total 
skepticism. For skeptheists, then, the proper attitude to take with respect to the 
existence of God is neither denial (i.e., we know that God does not exist), as atheists 
would have it, nor suspension of judgment (i.e., we do not know whether or not God 
exists), as agnostics would have it, but skepticism (i.e., we cannot know whether or not 
God exists). For skeptheists, there is no way to know (or have good reasons to believe) 
that God exists. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 Alternatively, agnostics might claim that there is no compelling evidence either for or against the existence of 
God. In other words, the available evidence for and the available evidence against the existence of God are equally 
convincing, or equally unconvincing, and thus we should suspend judgment until further evidence comes to light. 
Cf. Oppy (2006, p. 15) on strong versus weak agnosticism. 
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